Truth and News: How Success Gets Marketed as Failure

Yesterday, Iraq's presidency council issued a law that will let thousands of of officials who served under Saddam Hussein to return to government jobs.

The Associated Press (AP) story's first paragraph ends with "viewed by the Bush administration as central to mending deep fissures between minority Sunni Arabs and Kurds and the majority Shiites who now wield power."

The second paragraph dutifully reported that the "U.S. military, meanwhile, said Monday that it accidentally killed nine Iraqi civilians...." The third and fourth paragraphs discussed American response to the killings.

Finally, the fifth paragraph gets back to the new Iraqi law. "The new law, which was passed by parliament on Jan. 12, was the first of 18 key U.S.-set benchmarks to become law after months of bitter debate. But it was issued without the signature of the Sunni vice president, and the presidency council cited reservations and plans to seek changes in the bill, clouding hopes it would encourage reconciliation." [emphasis mine]

Reading that paragraph, it's pretty obvious that this law is the first benchmark that Iraq met, right? And, that despite its passage, it may not achieve its goal?

The reader is reminded that this is the first benchmark, in the eleventh paragraph: "The law is the first of 18 pieces of benchmark legislation demanded by the Bush administration to promote reconciliation among Iraq's Sunni and Shiite Arab communities and the large Kurdish minority." Well, the first legislative benchmark. Same thing, right?

Wrong.

The Government Accountability Office gave a more detailed progress report last September:

• Three benchmarks met
  • #8
  • #14 (32/34ths of it, anyway)
  • #16
• Five benchmarks partly met
  • #4
  • #5
  • #9
  • #12
  • #17

By my reckoning, and the GAO's, Iraq's got at least four benchmarks taken care of now, not one.

The law discussed in the AP article, together with an unrelated American accident (atrocity?), may be the first piece of Iraqi legislation to meet one of the 18 benchmarks, but it is far from the first benchmark met.

From a technical point of view, this Associated Press story is an excellent piece of writing. The AP was faced with the fact that Iraq is almost a third of the way through the 18 benchmarks "demanded" by the Bush administration.

However, by careful and precise phrasing, the reader can be left with the impression that this first legislative benchmark was the first benchmark of any sort to be met: and reminded of innocent civilians killed by the American military machine.

Every fact in the AP article is, to the best of my knowledge, accurate. The impression that the 'failed policies' in Iraq have met with pathetically limited success, while costing innocent lives, may not be accurate.

I could be wrong, but it looks like traditional news services are dedicated to the proposition that all American actions are created suspect. And that even when an American policy is working, there must be tragic costs in human life, civil rights, and/or ecological balance.

So, while reading about the latest American failure, or hearing the daily death toll on the news: take a deep breath, count to ten, and think. Then, tweeze apart the facts from the verbiage, sort the facts into categories, and see what actually happened, and what's being said.

---

Distortions of truth aren't limited to America. Over in the United Kingdom, one in four Britons think that Winston Churchill is a fictional character. On the other hand, half believe that Eleanor Rigby was a real person.

It's not just Churchill, either. Mahatma Gandhi, Cleopatra and the Duke of Wellington are on the list of people that many Britons think were made up for movies and television.

More Reports on Iraq: Day 2, the GAO Report

The Government Accountability Office report, GAO-07-1195, is an update of an a sort of work-in-progress draft released in July, 2007.

I appreciated the table that the new GAO report put, on the third sheet. It's easier to see the overall pattern of the report that way.

The picture isn't rosy, by any means. I've copied the 18 "Benchmarks," and whether they were met or not (according to the GAO), with a GAO comment following. My comments on each are in parentheses.

1. Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and completing the constitutional review.

Not Met

Committee formed but amendments not approved by the Iraqi legislature and no referendum scheduled.

(They haven't thrashed out how much power the president will have, for one thing. I'm not surprised. That's something that's still being debated in Washington.)

2. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification.

Not Met (not quite)

(Laws drafted. Iraqi Shi'a, and Sunni Arab, and Kurdish, leaders are still working on what to do. Better this, than a quickie get-the-Ba'athists, or amneesty-for-all "solution.")

3. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner

Not Met (not quite)

3 of 4 components drafted; none being considered by parliament.

(This one is really complicated: four interrelated points, over a high-value economic prize, involving groups that haven't gotten along very well for the last thirty years, at least.)

4. Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions.

Partly Met

Law enacted; implementation scheduled for 2008.

(That's less than 4 months away: And the delay in enactment was built into the law.)

5. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.

Partly Met

Commission law enacted and implemented; however, supporting laws not enacted.

(Not bad, nder the circumstances.)

6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.

Not Met

No law drafted.

("No progress" may not be a bad thing here. We're talking about amnesty for the equivalent of Nazi war criminals here, without the heavy-handed bunch of victors with righteous indignation that facilitated the Nuremburg trials.)

7. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq.

Not Met

No law drafted.

(This is one that I regard as a real problem: You can't run a country, with war bands running around, killing people they don't approve of.)

8. Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad security plan.

Met

Committees established.

(Now, let's hope the committees do something besides have meetings.)

9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations.

Partly Met

Forces provided; some of limited effectiveness.

(It could be worse. Of 19 Iraqi units supporting operations in Baghdad; 5 units had performed well; 14, not so much.)

10. Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.

Not Met

Political intervention continues.

(Isn't that what politicians do? I've gotten the impression that part of the job of politicos is to second-guess military leaders.)

11. Ensuring that Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law.

Not Met

Iraqi security forces engaged in sectarian-based abuses.

(This is very serious. "In May 2007, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom reported that Iraq's Shi'a-dominated government bears responsibility for engaging in sectarian-based human
rights violations, as well as tolerating abuses committed by Shi'a militias with ties to political factions in the governing coalition." (page 44))

12. Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said “the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation.”

Partly Met

Militia infiltration of some security forces enables some safe havens.

(There's actually something of a breakthrough here. Sadr City is no longer protected by the Iraqi government from law enforcement and military action.)

13. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security.

Not Met

Militias control some local security; unclear whether sectarian violence has decreased.

(The report seems to treat this as a subheading of Benchmark 7.)

14. Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad.

Met

32 of 34 stations established.

(Looking back at the report's rating of point 5, shouldn't this be a "1"? Only 94% of the security stations are in place! Seriously, this is pretty good work.)

15. Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently.

Not Met

Number of independent units declined between March and July 2007.

(This is not good, but the problem seems to be a matter of finding ways to find supplies, and get them to the units. I should think this would be easier to solve than the problem of getting people to stop killing each other over tribal rivalries and religious details.)

16. Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.

Met

Legislators' rights protected; minority citizens' rights unprotected.

(This is limited good news.)

17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis.

Partly Met

Funds allocated but unlikely to be fully spent.

(A government not spending money as a problem: that's an idea that takes getting used to.)

18. Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces.

Not Met

Unsubstantiated accusations continue to be made.

(Fair enough. False accusations by someone in power is trouble, as the Duke Lacrosse situation showed.)

Okay, that was the GAO report.

I'd have liked to see more of those benchmarks met. On the other hand, and with due respect to the members of Congress, I wonder how well the House and Senate would score, if they an outside agency started looking at their performance?

The GAO report is available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071195.pdf. I'd strongly recommend getting a copy, and comparing what politicos and experts will be saying it says, to what it actually says.

I'm afraid that even the best minds are subject to wishful thinking.

Posts on this topic:

• More Reports on Iraq: Day 2, Where to Find Reports
  (September 7, 2007)
• More Reports on Iraq: Day 2, the Independent Commission Report
  (September 7, 2007)
• More Reports on Iraq: Day 2, the GAO Report
  (September 7, 2007)
• More Reports of Iraq: Day 1
  (September 7, 2007: about 1:00am)

Iraq, Congress, and the Initial Benchmark Assessment Report

Or, Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory
Or, There's Nothing so Lovely as Surrender in April.

As usual, Iraq is in the news.

According to what I read in the news, the Malachi government in Iraq got a "satisfactory" rating on only 8 of 18 "benchmarks", mixed reviews for 2 more, and for the 8 remaining, in an interim report: the Initial Benchmark Assessment Report.

The report I read had a different count:

• 9 benchmarks met: (i), (iv), (viii), (ix), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xvi), (xvii)
• 7 benchmarks not met: (ii),(iii), (vii), (x), (xi), (xv), (xviii)
• 2 benchmarks with a mixture of achieved and unachieved goals: (v), (vi).)

Here's the report, in pdf and html format, from the White House.

The current administration, trying to help leaders in Iraq set up a working government after over 30 years of a selfish tyrant's mismanagement, decided to increase the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. These soldiers were going to wage war on al Qaeda in Iraq, and anyone else who wanted to overthrow or disrupt the Iraqi government.

This has been called a "troop surge." Actually, the current strategy is called "the New Way Forward."

The last deployment of the U.S. troops involved in the "surge" arrived in Iraq just a few weeks ago.

According to the White House report, this "strategy -- the New Way Forward -- recognizes that the fulfillment of commitments by both the U.S. and Iraqi Governments will be necessary to achieving our common goal: a democratic Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself, and be an ally in the War on Terror."

There's already progress. Limited progress, but progress.

The report says, "Tough fighting should be expected through the summer as Coalition and Iraqi Forces seek to seize the initiative from early gains and shape conditions for longer-term stabilization. These combined operations -- named Operation Phantom Thunder -- were launched on June 15, 2007, after the total complement of surge forces arrived in Iraq. The full surge in this respect has only just begun."

With a three-week-old major offensive showing limited progress, together with efforts at political reconciliation at the national, provincial, and local level, Iraq has a chance at getting a working government. A good chance, according to the White House.

Faced with the imminent threat of military and political success in Iraq, the United States House of Representatives acted with a decisiveness seldom seen on Capitol Hill.

A headline in the Washington Post says it well: House passes bill to withdraw troops from Iraq.

The measure, which passed a few hours ago, would have the Pentagon start withdrawing troops within four months, with all but a token force of 10,000 out of Iraq by April 1 of next year. The skeleton crew left behind would "train Iraqi soldiers, conduct counter-terrorism operations and protect U.S. diplomats."

al Qaeda and all the others who don't like U.S. efforts to help Iraq have been reassured by the House of Representatives. If they hunker down and survive until April of next year, they can enjoy a victory that will make the evacuation of Saigon, back in 1975, look like a tea party. Come to think of it, Saigon fell in late April, 1975, roughly April 27-30.

About the slow political progress in Iraq, the report says that there is "increasing concern among Iraqi political leaders that the United States may not have a long term-commitment to Iraq."

In other words, the Iraqis who are trying to put their country back together were worried that U.S. political leaders would do exactly what they did do.

The House of Representatives' notion of peacemaking goes to the Senate next. What they'll do, with 2008 elections coming up, is anyone's guess.

I sincerely hope that this nation's leaders are not putting polls and their own campaign plans above the good of the people who live in this country.

Whatever Congress decides, and whatever their motives, the odds are that they'll get to have their elections in 2008. November is only 7 months after April.

*-*-*-*-*

My academic and business experience has taught me that it's best to read original documents: not what someone says the original documents say. The only place, aside from the White House website, that I found a link to the White House report was the Fox Newsarticle.

Here's my summary of what the "Initial Benchmark Assessment Report" of July 12, 2007, says about the benchmarks.

The report itself is useful, if somewhat tedious, reading. (Available at the White House site, in pdf and html format).

• (i) Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the constitutional review.
  * satisfactory progress


• (ii) Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification reform.
  * unsatisfactory


• (iii) Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources to the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.
  * unsatisfactory, but it is too early to tell whether the Government of Iraq will enact and implement legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources to all Iraqis.


• (iv) Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions.
  * satisfactory progress


• (v) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.
  * Multiple components to this benchmark, each deserving its own assessment:


• Establishing the IHEC Commission:
  * satisfactory progress


• Elections Law:
  * unsatisfactory progress


• Provincial Council Authorities:
  * unsatisfactory progress


• Provincial Elections Date:
  * unsatisfactory progress


• (vi) Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.
  * hard to say -- prerequisites for a successful general amnesty are not present; however, in the current security environment, it is not clear that such action should be a near-term Iraqi goal


• (vii) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the constitution of Iraq.
  * prerequisites ... are not present.


• (viii) Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.
  * satisfactory progress


• (ix) Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations.
  * satisfactory progress


• (x) Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders without political intervention to include the authority to pursue all extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.
  * unsatisfactory progress


• (xi) Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law.
  * unsatisfactory progress


• (xii) Ensuring that, as Prime Minister Maliki was quoted by President Bush as saying, "the Baghdad Security Plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation."
  * satisfactory progress


• (xiii) Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security.
  * satisfactory progress


• (xiv) Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad.
  * satisfactory progress


• (xv) Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently.
  * unsatisfactory progress


• (xvi) Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.
  * satisfactory progress


• (xvii) Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis.
  * satisfactory progress


• (xviii) Ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the ISF.
  * unsatisfactory progress